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4
Employment and Wage Impacts 
of Immigration: Theory
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter demonstrates how economic theory can be used to analyze 
the economic impact of immigration. The discussion starts with the simplest 
case and progresses to more complex specifications in order to illustrate the 
various channels through which immigration affects labor markets and how 
the economy’s adjustments mitigate those effects over time. Because adjust-
ments take time, particularly when immigration is unexpected, the initial 
and longer run impacts of immigration differ. The impact of immigration 
will also depend on the size of the inflow, the skill composition of immi-
grants compared to that of the native-born population, and characteristics 
of the destination country economy such as the ease with which firms can 
adopt or develop new technologies and the speed at which capital can accu-
mulate or move between industries, as well as the economic links between 
that country’s regions and its degree of integration with the world economy.
Theory predicts that immigration initially confers net economic ben-
efits on the destination country economy while creating winners and losers 
among the native-born via changes in the wage structure and the return to 
capital. Resulting changes in factor prices increase the production of goods 
and services that use the type of labor that immigrants provide most inten-
sively. With time, the capital stock adjusts and eventually technology may 
respond as well, pushing up the demand for labor and hence wages toward 
their original levels. It bears noting that, if firms anticipate immigration 
and there is no lag in the response of capital and technology, the length of 
time elapsing between an immigration inflow and the “long-run” adjust-
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ment of the labor market could be very short. Either way, if the economy 
simply returns to a larger version of its pre-immigration state, with the same 
capital-labor ratio, there are no winners and losers among the native-born, 
but equally, no net benefit to them from immigration. 
This chapter provides a simple, largely graphical description of the 
often mathematically complex theoretical models that economists use to 
analyze the impact of immigration (or other labor supply shocks). The 
analysis relies heavily on the shifting of supply and demand curves, since 
these are most familiar to a general audience. It should be emphasized 
that these graphics only partly reflect the dynamic and general equilibrium 
characteristics of the models described here.
Most of the analysis is qualitative, designed to identify the mechanisms 
through which an influx of new immigrants is likely to affect wages and 
returns to capital as well as the overall level of income enjoyed by the 
native-born population that absorbs them. The concept of an immigration 
surplus as developed by Borjas (1995b) is introduced to quantify how, 
abstracting from fiscal effects, the arrival of immigrants affects the welfare 
of the native-born population on net. The panel quantifies these effects by 
inserting aggregate measures from national accounts or parameter estimates 
from empirical research. The emphasis here is on providing plausible orders 
of magnitude for the changes we model and should not be confused with 
the statistical estimation that is at the heart of Chapter 5.
4.2 A SIMPLE MODEL WITH A SINGLE TYPE OF LABOR
To understand the impact of immigration as seen through the prism 
of economic theory, it is easiest to begin by analyzing the simplest pos-
sible model, one constrained by highly unrealistic assumptions, and then 
consider the implications of more complicated models that arise as at least 
some of these assumptions are removed. We begin by assuming that the 
economy is inhabited by a large number of identical individuals and firms 
and that all economic activity is devoted to the production of a single 
consumption good. Firms produce this good by combining two highly 
aggregated inputs: work effort or labor, for which the individuals in this 
economy receive a wage (w) paid by the firm, and the physical capital (the 
tools, equipment, machinery, and buildings) each firm owns. We assume 
that all individuals devote a fixed amount of time to work activities (the 
quantity of labor supply is perfectly inelastic—it does not respond to wage 
changes) and that the stock of physical capital is initially fixed. For the 
moment, we also assume that ownership of firms is equally distributed 
across the population, whose wage income is supplemented by dividends 
paid by these firms. For simplicity of expression, we use the term “native” 
to refer to the native-born population.
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Initial Labor Market Effects of Immigration
The diagram in Figure 4-1 describes the labor market in this simple 
model of the economy. For firms, the demand for labor is a decreasing 
function of wages represented initially by LD1, and the labor supplied by the 
native workers is fixed at N. The initial equilibrium (denoted by the number 
1) is the point where labor supply LS1 and labor demand L
D
1  cross, and this 
point determines the wage w1. In this economy, total income is equivalent 
to the amount produced of the single good and is represented by the area 
underneath the demand curve: the triangle A and the two rectangles B and 
C, or A + B + C. The area of the two rectangles B + C represents the income 
the people in this economy receive from firms as labor earnings (N × w1). 
The triangle A represents the accounting profits received by firms from the 
sale of goods after the cost of labor has been paid; these profits are assumed 
to be remitted to the population as dividends.
Now consider what happens when there is a sudden unanticipated 
increase in the population due to an influx of new immigrants. These new 
immigrants increase the total labor supply from N to N + M, and the labor 
supply curve shifts from LS1 to L
S
2. Crucially, we assume these new immi-
grants arrive without capital and that they do not receive a share of the 
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FIGURE 4-1 Labor market (with inelastic labor supply) response to an influx of 
immigrant workers.
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existing capital, which remains wholly owned by the native-born popula-
tion. At the new equilibrium (marked with the number 2), wages are w2 
(w2<w1), so the immediate effect of the influx of new immigrants is to drive 
down the wage. Now firms pay wage income to workers (N × w2), corre-
sponding to rectangle C, to the native population, and w2 × M, correspond-
ing to rectangle D, to immigrants; the value of the total amount of goods 
produced increases to A + B + C + D + E. The profits earned by the firms 
increase from the area represented by triangle A to A + B + E. Rectangle B 
represents the amount firms once paid as wages to natives but which now 
is paid to them as dividends instead. Triangle E represents the part of the 
overall increase in income (D + E) not captured by the immigrants them-
selves; this is commonly called the “immigration surplus.” The immigration 
surplus represents the benefit that accrues to the native population from an 
inflow of new immigrants.
Although immigrants are consumers as well as workers, the demand 
curve for labor does not shift outward in this simple model until capital 
adjusts. The reason for this is that the demand curve is determined by the 
economy’s productive capacity, and the addition to aggregate consumption 
created by the immigration-driven population growth is represented as a 
movement along the demand curve. Although the extra labor causes the 
aggregate amount of output to rise, per-capita output—output divided by 
the new, higher number of people in the economy—initially declines. To 
summarize, in this simple theoretical model of the labor market, the influx 
of immigrants initially drives down wages but native incomes still rise in 
the aggregate due to the immigration surplus.
Initial Capital Market Effects of Immigration
There are two input factors in this model economy, capital and labor, 
and it is important to also consider how immigration affects the market for 
capital. The diagram in Figure 4-2, which describes the capital market in this 
economy, is sufficient to illustrate most of the changes that occur following 
an influx of additional workers. The cost of capital for firms can be either 
the interest rate at which they borrow or, if funded from retained earnings, 
the rate of return available on an alternative investment. In this simple frame-
work, the two are identical. Meanwhile, the economy-wide cost of capital for 
households is the rate of return on their asset holdings. The demand curve for 
capital slopes downward since firms choose to acquire less new capital and 
hold less existing capital at higher rates of return (or cost of capital for the 
firm).1 The amount of capital available is initially fixed at K1 and the initial 
equilibrium (denoted by the number 1) determines the initial rate of return r1. 
1 We use the term rate of return rather than cost of capital because our focus is on the two 
sources of income for households, namely wages and the return on assets.
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The area underneath the demand curve once again equals the amount of the 
single good produced as well as total income. The area of the rectangle A in 
Figure 4-2 is the amount r1 × K1 paid by firms as dividends and corresponds 
exactly to the area of the triangle A in Figure 4-1. Likewise, the areas of the 
triangle C and the right trapezoid B in Figure 4-2 correspond to the areas 
of the rectangles B and C respectively in Figure 4-1. This once more is the 
amount the firm initially pays in wages.
An influx of new immigrants (an increase in labor relative to capital) 
makes each unit of the pre-existing capital stock more productive. The 
rightward shift in the demand curve for capital from KD1  to K
D
2 in Figure 4-2 
captures this rise in the rate of return to capital. If one assumes that the 
production technology has an attribute economists call constant returns to 
scale—which specifies that output quantity increases by the same propor-
tion as the quantity of all inputs—the horizontal distance between KD1 and 
KD2, measured in percentage terms, is equal to M/N (the ratio of immigrant 
to native labor).2 The right trapezoid B is the amount of income once paid 
2 Constant returns to scale means that if all the inputs increase by x percent, the output they 
produce increases by the same x percent.
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as wages but now paid as dividends, and the wages paid to the natives are 
reduced to the triangle C. The area in trapezoid D represents the wages 
paid to immigrants, and triangle E once again represents the immigrant 
surplus. Modeling the impact of immigration in terms of its impact on the 
market for capital is admittedly less intuitive than modeling it in terms 
of its impact on the labor market. However, the rise in the rate of return 
to capital from r1 to r2 in Figure 4-2 underlines an important insight: the 
immigration surplus arises because the labor supplied by new immigrants 
makes native-owned capital more productive. Restating, immigration raises 
the return to capital, making capital more productive and increasing income 
to owners of capital.
How Big Is the Immigration Surplus?
How can one quantify the size of the immigration surplus? A simple 
approximation for the area E in Figure 4-1 yields 
1
2
(w2 –w1)M  or, restated 
as a fraction of total output Y, E equals
 
1
2
M
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2 w2N
Y
ΕLL , where ΕLL  is the 
elasticity of the own-factor price for labor (that is, the percentage change 
in wages divided by the percentage change in labor between point 1 and 
point 2),
 
w1N
Y  
represents the share of income initially paid to natives, and 
M
N  
is the size of the immigration surge relative to the native workforce.3 In 
the United States, 65 percent of total national income is paid as employee 
compensation; it is therefore reasonable to assume that the elasticity of the 
own factor price for labor is −0.35 and the elasticity of the rate of return 
with respect to labor is 0.65.4 The area represented by triangle E grows 
quadratically with the increase in the proportion of new immigrants so, 
unless the increase in the workforce generated by an influx of new immi-
grants is very large, the overall increase in income will be relatively small. 
A 1 percent increase in the workforce caused by an influx of immigrants 
3 From Borjas (2014), we define the factor price elasticity ΕLL =
w2 − w1
w1
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠ /
M
N
( )  which 
is the inverse of the elasticity of labor demand. Therefore 
w2 −w1
Y
= ΕLL
M
N
w1
Y
 and 
1
2
(w2 −w1)M
Y
= 1
2
M
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2 w1N
Y
ΕLL .
4 For a simple Cobb-Douglas production function, these elasticity values follow directly 
from the share of national income paid as employee compensation (equal to 0.65) and the 
 approximation ΕLL =
w1N
Y
–1 . In this case the immigration surplus is –
1
2
M
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
(1+ ΕLL)ΕLL .
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lowers wages by 0.35 percent, raises the rate of return to capital by just 
under eight basis points (or 0.08%) and generates an immigration surplus 
of $199 million for the native population in an economy with an annual 
gross domestic product (GDP) of $17.5 trillion.5 An increase in the work-
force twice as large, equivalent to 2 percent of the U.S. workforce, generates 
a decline in wages of 0.75 percent and an immigration surplus four times 
larger, equivalent to $796 million.6 Rather than focus on an incremental 
inflow of workers, the model can also generate estimates of the wage impact 
and immigration surplus of the entire immigrant population. Immigrant 
labor accounts for 16.5 percent of the total number of hours worked7 in 
the United States, which, using this methodology, implies that the cur-
rent stock of immigrants lowered wages by 5.2 percent and generated an 
immigration surplus of $54.2 billion, representing a 0.31 percent overall 
increase in income that accrues to the native population. However, it bears 
noting that it is problematic to apply the same static methodology used for 
small temporary inflows to measuring the impact of the entire population 
of immigrants, which has grown over the course of decades. Over such a 
long period of time, capital has had plenty of time to adjust, and so these 
estimates can at best be described as upper limits that exaggerate the real 
impact of immigration on native wages and overall incomes.8
In summary, natives’ incomes rise in aggregate as a result of immigra-
tion; the size of the increase depends on the number of immigrants rela-
tive to natives, natives’ share of income, and the size of the wage effect of 
immigration.
5 The cross-factor elasticity that measures the increase in gross returns in response to the 
increase in the labor force is defined as ΕKL =
r2 – r1
r1 +δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
/
M
N
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ . For a simple Cobb-Douglas 
production function, ΕKL =
w1N
Y
. If one assumes a capital output ratio of 3 and a rate of 
depreciation of 0.05, the initial net real rate of return to capital is 6.67 percent.
6 An immigration influx 10 times larger than the 1 percent example—one that increases the 
labor force by 10 percent—will have an impact on both wages and the return to capital that 
is also about 10 times larger. Wages drop by 3.5 percent and the rate of return to capital rises 
by about 75 basis points. However, because of the squared term in the formula for the immi-
gration surplus, the surplus increases 100-fold, to $19.9 billion. Hence the ratio between the 
benefit that accrues to natives as a group (total income = wages + dividends) from immigration, 
compared to the amount of redistribution between different sources of income (wages versus 
dividends), rises rapidly with the immigration influx. 
7 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS), unweighted average across years 
2013, 2014, and 2015.
8 Ben-Gad (2004) demonstrated that dynamic calculations of the surplus are considerably 
lower than those obtained using Borjas’ (1995b) static approach.
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Who Gets the Immigration Surplus?
Consider the factors that affect the decrease in the wage bill paid to 
natives, represented by the area of rectangle B in Figure 4-1. A decline in 
wages of 0.35 percent in this simple model economy, assuming a GDP of 
$17.5 trillion, implies that as much as $39.6 billion that was once paid as 
wages is now paid as returns to capital (for the 1% immigration-induced 
workforce increase scenario). Of course this is immaterial if our initial (unre-
alistic) assumption holds that all the natives are identical and own equal 
shares of the nation’s capital stock. Indeed, even if people have radically 
different levels of income, as long as everyone shares the same proportion of 
income derived from wage earnings and capital income, the shift between the 
two generated by immigration has no impact on the distribution of income. 
But what if the proportions are not equal? If, to take an extreme example, the 
population is divided between those who derive all their income from work 
and others who derive all their income from capital, the shift in resources 
described in this example is potentially substantial. Even for the case of a 1 
percent increase in the number of workers, the shift from wages to income 
from capital outweighs the immigration surplus by a factor of nearly 200. 
In practice, most people derive at least some of their lifetime income 
from capital, if not directly through capital gains, dividends, rents, or inter-
est payments, then indirectly through the ownership of their own residence 
and through pension savings. Still, the composition of income varies sig-
nificantly across the income distribution, with those at the very top receiv-
ing larger shares of their income from capital than those at the bottom.9 
This means that not only does a disproportionate share of the immigration 
surplus accrue to people who enjoy higher incomes but the shift in overall 
income composition in response to immigration can at least initially exac-
erbate income inequality and could leave some people absolutely worse off.
In summary, the immigration surplus stems from the increase in the 
return to capital that results from the increased supply of labor and the 
subsequent fall in wages. Natives who own more capital will receive more 
income from the immigration surplus than natives who own less capital, 
who can consequently be adversely affected.
9 The Gini coefficient for earnings is 0.489 but 0.898 for interest, 0.789 for dividends and 
0.753 for rents, royalties, estates or trusts (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). Zero on the Gini 
scale indicates perfect equality in distribution (of earnings, or income, or whatever is being 
measured), and a score of 1.0 indicates total inequality. Salaries, wages, and pension income 
account for 91.17 percent of income for people in the top 10 to 5 percent of the income dis-
tribution, 83.35 percent for people in the top 5 to 1 percent, 72.34 percent for people in the 
top 1 to 0.5 percent, 60.46 percent for the top 0.5 to 0.1 percent, 46.65 percent for the top 
0.1 to 0.01 percent, and 33.47 percent for the top 0.01 percent (Alvaredo et al., 2013).
The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION: THEORY 173
The Effects of Capital Adjustment:  
What If Immigrants Bring Capital with Them?
All the changes in wages and the distribution of income analyzed above 
are predicated on the assumption that the aggregate stock of capital remains 
fixed even as the income each unit generates increases. More likely one 
should expect that, as the influx of immigration raises the rate of return 
to capital from r1 to r2 in Figure 4-2, an incentive is created for more of 
it to be produced or to flow from abroad. The accumulation of additional 
capital has a number of effects: wages are restored to their original level, 
the return to capital falls, and the immigration surplus dissipates. As noted 
below, this is typically referred to as the long-run impact of immigration 
because capital responds with a lag when immigration is unanticipated.
One can also illustrate the impact of capital’s response to immigra-
tion with the following thought experiment: What would happen if each 
immigrant not only supplied additional labor, but arrived in the country 
with an amount of capital that matched the capital holdings of the natives? 
Once again the supply curve for labor shifts from LS1 to L
S
2, but now this 
is accompanied by a shift in the demand curve from LD1 to L
D
2 as the addi-
tional capital the immigrants bring raises the marginal product of labor. 
If one further assumes a constant returns to scale production technology, 
the economy reaches equilibrium points marked by the number 3 in both 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2, where neither the wage nor the rate of return to capi-
tal changes, there is no immigration surplus or change in the composition 
of income, and the initial ratios between capital and output and labor and 
output are restored. The economy is larger, of course, but all the benefits of 
immigration, whether in terms of wage earnings, represented by the areas 
D, E, and F, or the income generated by the capital imported by the new 
immigrants, represented by areas G and H, accrue to the new immigrants. 
This implies that programs designed to facilitate the immigration of people 
who agree to invest in the domestic economy will indeed ameliorate or even 
reverse the impact of immigration on wages and the distribution of income; 
but, perhaps counterintuitively, such programs will also reduce or eliminate 
the immigration surplus that otherwise would accrue to natives.
Assuming constant returns to scale, if immigrants bring enough capi-
tal with them such that the capital-labor ratio does not change, then the 
economy simply grows larger. There is no negative wage impact nor is there 
an immigration surplus.10
10 If production is characterized by increasing returns to scale, where a particular fractional 
increase in all inputs yields more than the same fractional increase in output, an influx of im-
migrants together with capital may generate a rise in wages and a positive immigration surplus.
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How Else Can Capital Adjust?
Of course immigrants need not arrive with capital for immigration to 
prompt an adjustment to the stock of capital. Instead, the upward pressure 
on the rate of return to capital generated by the arrival of new workers pro-
vides an incentive for capital to either flow from abroad or to accumulate 
domestically. Here it is important to emphasize the unique attributes of the 
U.S. economy compared with smaller counterparts. Often it is appropriate 
to analyze the behavior of an economy using a small open-economy model. 
This is particularly appropriate if a large fraction of the economy’s output 
is devoted to exports, if it is very open to inflows of capital from abroad, 
and if it represents such a small share of world output that changes in eco-
nomic conditions originating in that country are unlikely to have meaning-
ful effects on the global economy. In the context of a small open economy, 
an influx of immigrant workers is likely to be accompanied by an inflow of 
capital from abroad. Those who own the newly invested capital also own a 
claim to the income it generates, represented by the area of G + H in Figure 
4-2. Once again, if capital flows into the economy along with the additional 
new immigrants, there is no change to native welfare or to the distribution 
of income between capital and labor.
Yet, even if capital flows freely into a small open economy and all the 
additional capital is readily purchased and easily transportable, there can 
still be substantial delays between the arrival of new immigrants and the 
time when new capital is ultimately installed. If the unexpected influx of new 
immigrants is relatively small, the resulting increase in the rate of return to 
capital will not be very large and will probably be very short-lived because 
the additional capital can be easily procured and installed at a low cost. 
Alternatively, if the influx of new immigrants is relatively large, the inflow of 
capital required to lower the rate of return to its long-run value will neces-
sarily be large as well. Any effort to expedite the process of procuring and 
installing large amounts of additional capital, particularly as the immigrant 
influx was unforeseen, carries additional costs.11 Meanwhile, during the 
period of adjustment, immigration exerts downward pressure on wages.
Of course the United States economy is not small and, as a conse-
quence, transactions with the rest of the world account for a smaller share 
of its economic activity than for any other industrialized country. This 
means that much of the new capital added to the economy following an 
influx of new immigrants is likely to be produced locally. Higher rates of 
11 Small open economy models typically include convex capital adjustment costs to ensure 
that investment is not more volatile than what one typically observes in the data. See, for 
 example, Hansen et al. (2015). Klein and Ventura (2009) analyzed the impact of enlarging the 
European Union and creating a common labor market in North America in a model where 
capital flows freely across borders. 
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return induce higher savings rates and some shifting of production from 
consumer goods to capital. Yet, because people generally dislike sharp fluc-
tuations in the amount they consume, this capital adjustment process may 
occur gradually, even in the absence of capital adjustment costs. Of course, 
if immigration is anticipated, then capital may adjust much faster. In fact, 
if the immigration episode is fully anticipated, capital can be increased in 
advance, reducing or eliminating the adjustment period.
Ben-Gad (2004) used a general equilibrium optimal growth model—
the standard macroeconomic model where savings and investment are 
endogenously determined—to investigate the behavior of wages, returns 
to capital, and the size of the immigration surplus following an unan-
ticipated change in immigration policy. To understand the overall effect of 
immigration flows, the change considered is a radical one—the permanent 
suspension of all future immigration to the United States. The result is a 
gradual increase in wages until they are 0.8 percent above their previous 
trend, and the rate of return to capital falls by 6 basis points, the equiva-
lent of a decrease in interest rates from 4.06 to 4.00 percent.12 Pursuing 
such a policy would mean relinquishing the immigration surplus. Yet, since 
capital gradually adjusts following the suspension of immigration, the loss 
measured in terms of the size of the U.S. economy in 2014 would amount 
to only about $4 billion.
Summarizing, even if immigrants arrive without capital, domestic sav-
ings and investment will rise as a result of the higher return to capital. Once 
the capital-labor ratio is restored, the adverse wage effect of immigration 
and the immigration surplus disappear. 
4.3 EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 
WITH ELASTIC LABOR SUPPLY
In exploring these simple models of the economy so far, we have 
assumed that the amount of labor each worker supplies is fixed rather than 
a function of wages or other income. Suppose instead that for each percent-
age increase in wages, workers, whether native or immigrant, increase the 
amount of labor l they supply to the market by v percent. The initial labor 
supply curve in Figure 4-3, LS1, is no longer vertical but slopes upwards and 
the total amount of labor supplied in equilibrium is N × l1. The arrival of 
M additional immigrants shifts the labor supply curve by the horizontal 
distance M to LS2, which exerts downward pressure on wages. Lower wages 
mean the equilibrium amount of labor supplied by each worker drops from 
12 Unlike the static analysis, here the change in immigration represents a change in long-run 
flows. The flow of immigrant workers dilutes the capital stock, hence any change in the flows 
has permanent (albeit small) effects on wages and the rate of return to capital.
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l1 to l2 while the aggregate amount of labor increases to (M + N)l2. Qualita-
tively, the results from the previous section do not change: the unanticipated 
arrival of immigrants increases the amount of labor in the economy and 
initially lowers wages. The difference is quantitative: the higher the value of 
the own-wage supply elasticity, v, the more the per capita amount of labor 
rather than the wage adjusts with the arrival of the immigrants.
If the factor price elasticity of labor demand is ΕLL< 0, the change 
in wages from w1 to w2 in Figure 4-3 following an immigration influx 
of size M is
 
ΕLL
1−νΕLL
M
N
w1  or
 
ΕLL
1−νΕLL
M
N
 when measured in percentage 
terms. The increase in the rate of return on capital is also mitigated by the 
adjustment of labor supply in response to lower wages; the demand curve 
for capital in Figure 4-4 initially shifts only part of the way outward and 
only shifts further as the supply of capital adjusts. The smaller the decline 
in wages the immigrants create, the smaller the immigration surplus they 
generate. 
The area of triangle E in Figure 4-3 corresponds to the immigration sur-
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and it also declines as the value of v increases. How large a value of v could 
one reasonably assume? Few econometric studies estimate a single elasticity 
of labor supply for the entire population. At minimum, labor econometri-
cians divide the population by gender and marital status and estimate elas-
ticities for each subpopulation. The highest value for v found by Blau and 
Kahn (2007) is 0.4 (for married women). If one treats v = 0.4 as an upper 
bound, and assuming once again that compensation of employees accounts 
for 65 percent of national income, the immigration influx that raises labor 
supply by 1 percent now yields an immigration surplus of only $175 mil-
lion, an influx of 2 percent yields $698 million, and the entire stock of 
current immigrants, who contribute 16.5 percent of total hours worked, 
yields $47.5 billion.13
13 By contrast, in Ben-Gad’s (2004) dynamic model with endogenous capital, if the  elasticity 
of labor supply is 0.75, the loss to natives of abolishing future immigration flows is only 
$3 billion.
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In summary, if some natives exit the labor force in response to immi-
gration, then there is an employment effect of immigration in addition to 
a wage effect. The wage effect is smaller, however, than in the case where 
native labor supply is fixed. 
4.4 MULTIPLE TYPES OF LABOR
Complementarities Between Worker Types
The simple models presented thus far have assumed there is a single 
labor market in the economy where all workers supply the same amount of 
labor and where this labor is qualitatively identical. In reality, workers differ 
in their levels of skill, experience, and education and in their occupations. 
Thus, in a modern economy there is not one uniform labor market but many.
To keep the analysis simple, we now assume that there are only two 
types of workers. One type supplies high-skilled labor and the other sup-
plies low-skilled labor. The distinction between the two types of workers is 
sometimes made on the basis of what type of jobs they perform, but more 
often it is imputed on the basis of how many years of schooling or educa-
tional qualifications they have accumulated. In the model explored here, 
firms employ both types of workers along with capital to produce final 
goods. For simplicity, we once again assume that each worker supplies a 
fixed amount of his or her type of labor in the market.
Immigrant worker type will be crucial in determining how their arrival 
will affect wages and the returns to capital. In Figures 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7, 
the panel considers the case in which all immigrants fall into the low-
skilled category—this is of course a gross simplification. In Figure 4-5, the 
arrival of Mu low-skilled immigrant workers, augmenting the population 
of low-skilled native workers Nu, means that, just as in Figure 4-1, the 
supply curve in the market for low-skilled labor LSu,1 shifts to L
S
u,2. Wages 
for low-skilled workers decline from their initial value of wu,1 to wu,2. In 
the economy with undifferentiated labor, the influx of immigrant workers 
in Figure 4-1 raised the productivity of the second factor of production, 
capital, as shown in Figure 4-2. Likewise, here, the influx of low-skilled 
workers complements the other two factors of production, capital and 
high-skilled labor, and raises their productivity. This change in the market 
for high-skilled labor is captured in Figure 4-6 by the shift in the demand 
curve LDs,1 to L
D
s,2 and the rise in wages for high-skilled workers from ws,1 
to ws,2. As before, the increase in the supply of one factor of production, in 
this case low-skilled labor, increases the value of the remaining factors, both 
high-skilled labor in Figure 4-6 and capital in Figure 4-7, where the influx 
of new immigrants once more causes the outward shift in the demand curve 
from KD1 to K
D
2 and raises the rate of return from r1 to r2.
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FIGURE 4-5 Low-skilled labor market response to an influx of low-skilled immi-
grant workers.
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FIGURE 4-7 Capital market response to an influx of low-skilled immigrant workers.
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How large are the initial changes in the two wages and the returns to 
capital likely to be? Start with the low-skilled natives who now face direct 
competition from immigrants in their labor market. Generally, the smaller 
the share of workers in a given category, the greater in absolute value the 
corresponding value of the factor price elasticity will be.14 Take the example 
in which the labor force is equally divi ed etween high-skilled and low-
skilled workers. In this case, a 1 percent increase in the overall number of 
workers will not depress overall wages as much as the wages of low-skilled 
workers would fall when the influx is only half as large but completely 
confined to the ranks of the low-skilled. When comparing the effects of an 
influx of equal absolute size, this contrast becomes yet more pronounced.
Moreover, the way the model distinguishes between different types of 
workers crucially affects how the wage rate will respond to influxes of new 
immigrants. The more the labor force is disaggregated, the larger the own-
wage response will be to an increase in immigration if all the immigrants are 
14 For Cobb-Douglas production functions, this is precisely true. The factor price elasticity 
of workers in category i is equal to
 
ΕLL =
wiNili
Y
−1 .
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confined to one particular category of labor. Even if the analysis is restricted 
to just two types of labor, the more broadly the category of high-skilled 
workers is defined, the more narrow the category of low-skilled workers 
will be and, in all likelihood, the larger (in absolute value) the correspond-
ing elasticity of the own-factor price for low-skilled labor ΕUU. What this 
means is that the slope of the low-skilled labor demand curve LDu,1 in Fig-
ure 4-5 is likely to be steeper than the slope of the aggregate labor demand 
curve LD1 in Figure 4-1.
The effect of low-skilled immigration on the other two factors of 
production largely depends on the value of elasticities ΕSU and ΕKU, which 
represent the percentage change in high-skilled wages and returns to capital, 
respectively, divided by the percentage change in the number of low-skilled 
workers. Most evidence suggests that these elasticities are positive but not 
very large. In other words, there is a relatively low degree of complementar-
ity and comparatively high degree of substitutability between low-skilled 
labor and both high-skilled labor and capital. This means that the shifts 
in the demand curves LDs,1 to L
D
s,2 and K
D
1 to K
D
2 are not likely to be very 
large, and consequently the initial increase in wages from ws,1 to ws,2, and 
the increase in returns to capital r1 to r2 are unlikely to be very large either.
The bottom line here is that immigration is predicted to raise native 
wages in the case where immigrant and native workers are complements, 
meaning their productivity rises from working together. Native workers 
who are substitutes for immigrants, however, will experience negative wage 
effects.
The Immigration Surplus with Immigrant–Native Complementarity
In the model above, the two elasticities ΕSU and ΕKU determine the size 
of the short-term immigration surplus, which now comprises two elements: 
the surplus that accrues to native high-skilled workers, represented by the 
triangle ES in Figure 4-6, and the surplus that accrues to whichever natives 
own capital, represented by the triangle EK in Figure 4-7.
15 The size of each 
triangle is determined by the magnitude of the shift in the demand curve 
which is, in turn, determined by the elasticities ΕSU and ΕKU. The sum of the 
two surpluses represented by ES and EK is equal to the area of the triangle 
marked ES + EK in Figure 4-5. Indeed, as long as the influx of immigrants 
is confined to one skill category, it is sufficient to know the elasticity of 
15 If one assumes the constant returns aggregate production function F(x) applies, there is a 
close relationship between all the factor price elasticities: jΕ ij = 0∑  and i∑ α iΕ ij = 0 , where 
Ε ij = α icij . The elasticity of complementarity between factors i and j is cij =
F x( )Fij
FiFj
.
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demand for that type of labor to determine the size of the immigration sur-
plus, which can then be calculated as it was in the case of undifferentiated 
labor, using the formula
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Suppose again that the population is equally divided between high- 
and low-skilled workers and that the former receive a wage twice as high 
as the latter. The share of income paid for low-skilled work is now one-
third of 0.65 (the overall share of earnings in total national income), or 
approximately 0.22, against 0.43 (the remaining portion) for high-skilled 
work. Finally, assume the value of ΕUU = −0.6. Together these values 
imply that an influx of low-skilled immigrants that increases the overall 
labor force by 1 percent but raises the size of the low-skilled workforce by 
2 percent lowers low-skilled wages by 1.2 percent. The influx generates an 
immigration surplus of just under $462 million for the $17.5 trillion U.S. 
economy, which is substantially larger than the immigration surplus in the 
model above that assumed only one type of labor. If one now assumes that 
ΕKU > 0, the value of ΕSU can be at most no higher than 0.31, which means 
wages for high-skilled workers increase by no more than 0.62 percent 
in response to the influx of low-skilled immigrants. Borjas (2014a) cited 
ΕSU = 0.05 as a more empirically plausible number, which implies a rise 
in wages of 0.1 percent. Furthermore, if ΕUU = −0.6 and ΕSU = 0.05, the 
income shares imply ΕKU = 0.32, so the losses experienced by low-skilled 
workers represent for the most part gains to owners of capital rather than 
to high-skilled wage earners.
Summarizing, the immigration surplus is larger when immigrant  workers 
are complementary to natives. Income from the surplus accrues to both own-
ers of capital and high-skilled workers when immigrants are low-skilled.
Capital Accumulation in a Model with  
Immigrant-Native Complementarities
As in the one-labor-category model (Section 4.2), the rise in the rate 
of return to capital in the two-category model induces capital inflows or 
capital accumulation. This process raises the wages of both types of work-
ers. Wages of high-skilled workers rise still further as the stock of capital 
grows, and the wages of low-skilled workers partially recover as well. Yet 
with more than one type of labor, neither the process of capital accumula-
tion nor even the free flow of capital from abroad is sufficient to guarantee 
that wages return to their previous levels for both groups following an 
unexpected immigration episode, even in the long run, unless it also affects 
native occupational choice and investment in education. And even then 
this adjustment is a very long-run phenomenon. What this means is that 
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the shift in low-skilled wages from wu,2 to wu,3 only partially mitigates the 
initial decline from wu,1.
16
Restating this, once the capital-labor ratio is restored, average wages 
are also restored, as in the model with just one type of labor. However, in 
a framework with two types of labor and regardless of any complementari-
ties, relative wages may not return to pre-immigration levels. If immigrants 
are low-skilled, the deterioration of the relative wages of low-skilled work-
ers may persist in the long run.
The Role of Capital-Skill Complementarity in the Immigration Surplus
There is one more aspect to the dynamic impact of capital accumulation 
in this context. Empirical work on U.S. manufacturing, dating back to work 
by Zvi Griliches (1969) and confirmed by subsequent research, suggests 
there is evidence of what economists call “capital-skill complementarity.”17 
Indeed, consistent with this evidence, in representing the demand curves 
in Figures 4-5 and 4-6, we assumed that the factor price elasticity of the 
demand curve for high-skilled workers is higher in absolute value than 
that corresponding demand curve for low-skilled workers—that is, that 
the demand curve for high-skilled workers is more steeply sloped than the 
demand curve for low-skilled workers. The result is that additional incre-
ments of capital raise the productivity and hence the wage of high-skilled 
workers more than they raise the wage of low-skilled workers. Though 
wages for both may rise, the additional capital also partly substitutes for 
low-skilled labor to a degree it does not substitute for high-skilled labor.
Capital-skill complementarity has another implication: The immigration 
surplus generated by an increase in the number of high-skilled workers is 
potentially much larger than for a similar-sized influx of low-skilled  workers. 
To see this, consider what happens in the market for high-skilled labor when 
the population of high-skilled native workers Ns is augmented by Ms high-
skilled immigrant workers. The labor supply curve shifts from LSs,1 to L
S
s,2 in 
Figure 4-8 and wages decrease from ws,1 to ws,2. The immediate impacts of 
16 This is the pattern found by Ben-Gad (2008), who simulated the dynamic behavior of 
wages and returns to capital following a temporary surge in either low-skilled or high-skilled 
immigration in a model with a nested constant elasticity of substition (nested CES) produc-
tion function that incorporates capital-skill complementarities. In Table 5-1 in Chapter 5, the 
panel considers a different configuration of the nested CES production function in which the 
elasticities of substitution between different types of labor vary but the elasticities of substitu-
tion between capital and the different types of labor are identical.
17 Studies by Fallon and Layard (1975) and Krusell and colleagues (2000) for the United 
States and by Duffy et al. (2004) using international data all confirm this finding. Goldin 
and Katz (1998) suggested that capital-skill complementarity emerged during the early 20th 
century with the transition from artisanal to mass production.
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FIGURE 4-8 High-skilled labor market response to an influx of high-skilled immi-
grant workers.
an influx of each category of immigrant labor skill on the demand for the 
second category in Figures 4-6 and 4-9 are qualitatively identical, as is the 
impact on the demand for capital in Figures 4-7 and 4-10.
What is different is that because of capital-skill complementarities, the 
outward shift in the demand curve from KD1 to K
D
2 in Figure 4-10 is assumed 
to be substantially larger than the shift in Figure 4-7. This means the rise in 
the rate of return is larger and the value of the capital-related component 
of the short-term immigration surplus EK is larger as well. Indeed, if one 
assumes that the share of national income captured by high-skilled immi-
grants is larger than the share captured by low-skilled immigrants and that 
the elasticity ΕUS is greater than ΕSU, then the demand curve in Figure 4-9 
shifts outward more than in Figure 4-6. Hence, a percentage increase in the 
number of high-skilled workers raises the wages of low-skilled workers by 
more than the same percentage increase in low-skilled workers raises the 
wages of the high skilled.
Assume once again that the initial population is divided equally between 
high- and low-skilled workers, and that high-skilled workers receive a wage 
twice that of the low skilled. Assume further that the demand for high-
skilled workers is more elastic than for low skilled, such that ΕSS = −0.9. 
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FIGURE 4-9 Low-skilled labor market response to an influx of high-skilled immi-
grant workers. 
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FIGURE 4-10 Capital market response to an influx of high-skilled immigrant 
workers.
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The immigration surplus generated by high-skilled immigrants, here equal 
to
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Y
ΕSS , of a 1 percent increase in the number of workers, 
all now high-skilled immigrants, is equal to just over $1.35 billion in a 
$17.5 trillion economy. 
Furthermore, because the rise in the rate of return is higher when high-
skilled rather than low-skilled immigrants are added to the economy, the 
inflow or accumulation of capital will be larger as well. This means that 
the further increase in low-skilled wages from wu,2 to wu,3 will be some-
what higher and that, in particular, a more significant portion of the loss in 
high-skilled wages will be corrected in the long term as the demand curve in 
Figure 4-8 shifts from LDs,1 to L
D
s,2. This means that even after the long-run 
accumulation of capital is accounted for, here the immigration surplus does 
not completely disappear. Simulations by Ben-Gad (2008) found that even 
if university-educated workers are only 2.7 times more productive than 
workers without degrees, university-educated immigrants generate a surplus 
for natives 10 times larger than the surplus generated by other immigrants. 
Immigration generates a surplus that accrues to both immigrants and 
natives, but the latter capture a larger share of the surplus when immigrants 
are skilled. Capital is likely more complementary to high-skilled than low-
skilled labor, which has implications for the immigration surplus. 
Immigration Surplus in the Long Run
It might seem odd that the influx of the same number of immigrants 
who are exclusively either high-skilled or low-skilled can each generate a 
surplus larger than the influx generated by immigrants in the model with 
undifferentiated labor. The reason for this result is that by altering the skill 
distribution in the economy, immigrant labor creates shifts in wages that 
represent opportunities for native-born workers. In other words, the arrival 
of new workers from abroad disrupts the relative supply of different factors 
of production, and it is this disruption that generates the immigration sur-
plus. The more disruptive the influx—here not only the number of workers 
but the mix of different skill types is altered—the greater the magnitude of 
the surplus.
This last point is emphasized by Borjas (2014a), who examined the 
immigration surplus for varying proportions of high- and low-skilled immi-
gration.18 In his model, the high-skilled group consists of workers with 
more than a high school education. Applying this criterion to data from 
the 2000 Decennial Census, 61.4 percent of natives can be categorized as 
18 See Chapter 6.
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high skilled, but only 48.9 percent of immigrants classify as such. Given 
that immigrants comprise approximately 15 percent of the U.S. workforce, 
the theoretically derived calculation of the short-run immigration surplus 
(where capital remains fixed) yields an estimate of between 0.24 percent 
and 0.5 percent of GDP, but the long-run surplus (after the stock of capital 
has adjusted) reduces to between 0.02 and 0.03 percent of GDP. Immigrants 
fail to generate a substantial surplus because they are too similar to the 
population absorbing them. By contrast, if all the immigrants were low 
skilled, the short-run surplus would be between 0.45 and 0.9 percent and 
the long-run surplus between 0.42 and 0.77 percent. If all the immigrants 
were high skilled, the corresponding numbers are 0.75 and 1.35 percent in 
the short run, and 0.16 and 0.31 percent in the long run. In the short run, 
natives benefit most from the arrival of high-skilled immigrants because of 
capital-skill complementarities, but in the long run, low-skilled immigrants 
generate the larger surplus because they are more dissimilar to natives. In 
all cases, once capital adjusts, capital-skill complementarity is less impor-
tant to the immigration surplus. The extent to which the immigrant skill 
set differs from that of natives has, in theory, comparatively more effect on 
the magnitude of the immigration surplus in the long run.
4.5 MULTIPLE TECHNOLOGIES AND MULTIPLE GOODS
Immigration and Output Mix
So far, this discussion has assumed that people in this model economy 
produce and consume some aggregate good (or, similarly, that there are 
many goods but they are produced using the same production technology). 
It is instructive to consider the impact of immigration under a set of alterna-
tive assumptions about the nature of markets, including in the context of a 
model designed to analyze the impact of international trade. 
Assume once again that the economy being modeled produces the 
goods it consumes by combining two factors, capital and labor, but instead 
of one type of good it now produces two distinct goods, designated A and 
B in the Lerner diagram in Figure 4-11.19 The technology represented has 
the familiar characteristic of constant returns to scale, but allows for differ-
ent combinations of capital and labor in the production of different goods. 
More specifically, to produce each unit of good A requires relatively large 
amounts of capital and less labor, while the production of good B employs 
relatively more workers and uses less capital. Assume further that all goods 
are freely traded internationally. This assumption simplifies the analysis 
because it implies that the prices of each good are set in global markets.
19 The diagram was developed by Lerner (1952). 
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FIGURE 4-11 The allocations of capital and labor in a two-good economy, before 
and after immigration.
The rays from the origin labeled A and B each represent the combi-
nation of capital and labor that is required to produce one of the final 
goods. The shaded area between the two rays is referred to as the cone of 
diversification. This means that, if the economy’s total initial endowment 
of productive inputs—its stock of capital K and available labor N—falls 
within this area, one expects this economy to produce both goods. The 
alternatives are that the economy exclusively produces good A if the initial 
endowment is to the left of the shaded area or exclusively produces good B 
if the initial endowment is to the right of the shaded area.
In the case assumed in Figure 4-11, initially—before the arrival of new 
immigrants—the production of good A employs most of the labor NA,1 
and capital KA,1, leaving only a comparatively small amounts NB,1 and KB,1 
employed in the production of good B. All this changes when the initial 
work force N is supplemented by the arrival of M new immigrants, causing 
the initial endowment to shift horizontally to the right. Still, as long as the 
shift is not large enough to carry the new endowment point outside the cone 
of diversification, the economy continues to produce both types of goods. 
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Since both goods are traded on world markets, and at fixed world prices, 
the amount of each good consumed does not change. What does change is 
the pattern of this economy’s trade with the rest of the world. 
Suppose that before the arrival of the immigrants, the economy 
exported A and imported B. After the arrival of the immigrants, the volume 
of trade would decline and, if the effect is sufficiently large, one expects 
a switch toward importing A and exporting B. Alternatively, if initially 
this economy imported A and exported B, the volume of this trade would 
increase. To provide a concrete example, suppose the garment industry in 
this economy is relatively labor intensive. Its domestic garment industry 
produces less than the total amount of garments consumed and the remain-
der is imported. The arrival of more labor will reduce the volume of these 
imports and increase the amount produced domestically.
Of course none of these rather extreme assumptions is particularly 
representative of the condition of the U.S. economy as it absorbs new 
workers from abroad. Neither the prices of different goods nor the wages 
or returns to capital are fixed in global markets, and this simple example 
abstracts from the way trade can shift production within sectors between 
different firms. Yet even if the assumptions are mostly unrealistic, the 
analysis is useful because it captures in a relatively extreme fashion an 
additional dimension through which immigration alters the U.S. economy: 
reallocating output between the production of different goods. Adjust-
ment through changes in the mix of goods produced, along with the 
subsequent changes in both the volume and pattern of international trade, 
implies less adjustment through factor prices and so will dampen, to some 
degree, the downward pressure immigration might otherwise exert on 
wages in the short run.
Of course final goods are not the only things traded—factor inputs 
including capital are imported and exported. Indeed the very process of 
international migration represents a flow of the factor input labor between 
countries and can serve as a substitute for trade in final goods. Workers can 
produce a good in a foreign country and export it to the United States, driv-
ing down both the price of the good paid by U.S. consumers and the wages 
of their American counterparts. Alternatively they can migrate to the United 
States and expand domestic production. Qualitatively the effect would be 
similar. Hence, there is some degree of substitution between international 
migration and international trade.
Summarizing, firms that use relatively labor-intensive technology ben-
efit more from immigration and respond by increasing production and, 
hence, their demand for labor. The subsequent change in the economy’s 
output mix is larger the closer the trade ties are between the receiving 
economy and the rest of the world, and this change further reduces any 
adverse impact of immigration on wages.
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Immigration and Technology
Thus far, the models discussed in this chapter have assumed that the 
technology for any given firm or industry is fixed and exogenously deter-
mined. In reality, technology progresses. Recognition that firms may have 
a choice of technologies, that the evolution of technology is likely to be 
influenced by changes in the composition of labor, and that immigrants 
themselves may hasten the process of technological change leads to an 
appreciation of additional links between immigration and wages.
Consider the possibility that a good may be produced with either of 
two technologies. Instead of assuming two different goods as above, Fig-
ure 4-11 now models an economy such that A and B represent different 
technologies.20 Method A is more capital intensive than method B, but if 
one assumes that wages and the rate of return to capital are determined on 
world markets, the analysis illustrated by Figure 4-11 does not change. An 
influx of new immigrants now causes the amount produced using technol-
ogy B to increase and the amount produced using technology A to decline. 
The aggregate amount of capital remains constant as long as its rate of 
return is determined on global markets, but the amount used by type A firms 
declines from KA,1 to KA,2, and the amount used by type B firms increases 
from KB,1 to KB,2. The shift in the allocation of capital reinforces the shifts 
in the allocation of labor, so that even though the total amount of labor in 
the economy grows, the amount employed by type A firms always declines 
from NA,1 to NA,2. Since this case assumes that the labor supplied by natives 
and by immigrants is identical, one can assume furthermore that all M 
new immigrants join type B firms. Even so, the number of native workers 
employed at type B firms increases as well, from NB,1 to NB,2. Hence, if one 
assumes the economy is completely open and all the relevant prices, includ-
ing wages and rates of return are determined on global markets, the econ-
omy can still absorb large numbers of immigrant workers by reallocating 
both capital and labor between the different types of technologies available.
As with the introduction of multiple goods, the introduction of differ-
ent modes of production for the same good provides an additional channel 
through which immigration may alter the economy and absorb some of 
the impact that might otherwise force down wages. In the case analyzed by 
Lewis (2013), this result extends beyond the two-factor example with only 
one type of labor to models with multiple types of labor. Namely, an influx 
of immigrants who supply a particular type of labor once again causes a 
portion of output to shift toward those firms that employ that labor most 
intensively. Adding more types of technology increases the range of possible 
responses of industry to an influx of new immigrants.
20 See Trefler’s (1998) analysis of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade.
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Of course, it is unlikely that the transition between different modes of 
production is instantaneous. Beaudry and Green (2005) modeled an econ-
omy that is gradually transitioning between older and newer, more advanced 
technologies that rely more heavily on both capital and high-skilled workers. 
They found that the pace at which the older technology is replaced is deter-
mined by the pace at which both physical and human capital accumulate. 
(Chapter 6 examines the role of human capital in more detail.) An influx of 
new immigrants alters not only the supply of overall labor relative to capital 
but also the relative supply of different types of labor, potentially changing 
the pace of the transition. Another implication of the Beaudry and Green 
model is that an increase in the number of high-skilled workers may not only 
lower the wages these workers can command in the market but, in contrast 
to the analysis in Section 4.4, may also lower the wage of low-skilled work-
ers as well, since capital shifts away from the traditional sector.
It is useful to go a step further, and ask how these different technolo-
gies arise. The shifting availability of workers with different levels or types 
of skill alters the incentives for the development of different types of tech-
nology. Hence, an influx of high-skilled workers would spur the develop-
ment of new technologies that complement the type of labor they supply. 
 Acemoglu (1998, 2002b) raised the possibility that while the arrival of 
a particular type of worker may lower wages in the short term, the new 
technologies that develop in response raise these workers’ productivity and 
ameliorate the decline in wages over time.
Indeed under certain conditions, particularly if there is a high degree of 
substitutability between the different workers in the economy, the long-run 
labor demand curve will slope upward.21 Consider once more an influx of 
high-skilled immigrants MS in Figure 4-12 that shifts the supply of labor 
from LSs,1 to L
S
s,2. In the initial phase, the wage drops from ws,1 to ws,2 along 
the short-run labor demand curve LDs,1. Over time, as new technologies are 
developed to take advantage of the now more plentiful supply of high-skilled 
labor, the demand curve shifts out to LDs,2 and wages increase from ws,2 to 
ws,3. The long-run demand curve for high-skilled labor is upward sloping.
It is further possible that immigration could speed technological prog-
ress for any given skill group if skilled immigrants are themselves innovative 
or provide entrepreneurial skills complementary to native innovators. This 
would reinforce the endogenous technological change just described. The 
theoretical link between immigrants and innovation is considered further in 
the context of immigration and economic growth in Chapter 6.
Once again, even for relatively small countries most of the assumptions 
made in the models discussed in this chapter are unrealistic. Even in small 
21 Acemoglu (2002a) used this mechanism to explain why the relative wage of college-
educated workers increased even as the supply of these workers grew. 
The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
192 THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wages of 
High- 
Skilled 
Workers 
ws,1 
ws,2 
Ns Ns+Ms 
1 
3 
2 
High-Skilled Labor 
ws,3 
Ls,2D
Ls,1D
Ls,3D
Ls,1S Ls,2S
R03045
Immigration
Figure 4-12
vector editable
FIGURE 4-12 High-skilled labor market response to an influx of high-skilled im-
migrant workers (with long-run technological change).
countries, wages and prices are not solely determined on international 
markets, and to a degree neither is the return to capital. Furthermore, not 
all goods are tradeable across different countries or even different regions. 
For a country as large as the Unit d Stat s, with its enormous and relatively 
autarkic internal market, these assumptions are even less realistic. How-
ever, it is important to emphasize that the assumptions for these models 
have been made to simplify the analysis and to isolate effects that are still 
likely to exist to some degree, even if none of the assumptions are strictly 
true in a real economy. What this means is that many of the wage effects 
described in earlier sections are likely to be diluted by the response of firms 
(for example, altering the mix of goods and services they produce, shifting 
between modes of production, or developing new technologies) as the labor 
supplied by new immigrants is made available in the market.
Summarizing, firms can also respond to immigration by implementing 
technologies that are complementary to the type of labor immigrants’ supply; 
this is another adjustment mechanism that mitigates adverse wage effects.
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4.6 RESPONSES BY NATIVES
Finally, we briefly note that there are other margins of adjustment to 
immigration that are not related to technology or even firms but also serve 
to reduce the wage impact of immigration. Of particular importance is 
that responses by natives may mitigate the wage effects of immigration. 
Individuals who compete with immigrants may choose to better exploit 
their comparative advantage in language or to upgrade their human capital. 
For example, if immigrants are not native speakers of English, immigration 
changes the comparative advantage of the native-born toward tasks that are 
more language and communication intensive and encourages them to shift 
into occupations utilizing these skills. This response mitigates negative wage 
impacts of immigration (Peri and Sparber, 2009). Furthermore, incentives 
to increase education are influenced by the wage structure, which is in turn 
affected by the entry of immigrant workers (Chiswick, 1989; Chiswick et 
al., 1992). If immigration causes increased wage inequality, younger natives 
may increase their education in response, mitigating negative wage impacts 
on the unskilled in the long run. Evidence of these effects is examined in 
the next chapter.
4.7 THE LINK BETWEEN IMMIGRATION 
AND FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT
How does immigration affect the rates of employment or unemploy-
ment of native workers? For the case of an elastic labor supply, the influx 
of immigrant workers in Figure 4-3 initially lowers the wage from w1 to 
w2, and the amount of work supplied by an average native declines from l1 
to l2. Yet this decline in the amount of work performed by natives does not 
correspond to an increase in the rate of unemployment as economists usu-
ally define this term. By the conventional definition, people are considered 
unemployed if they are willing to work at the prevailing wage but cannot 
find a firm willing to hire them. 
In modern economies there are nearly always some people who are 
unemployed and, at the same time, some number of firms with vacan-
cies they wish to fill. Over time, as the unemployed fill existing vacancies, 
 others lose or quit their jobs and new people enter the labor market. Simi-
larly, even as some firms die or shrink in size, causing workers to become 
un employed, other firms expand or are established, creating new vacancies. 
Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) constructed models 
in which this type of frictional unemployment emerges from the behavior 
of the unemployed searching for new jobs and firms searching for new 
employees. In these models, an unemployed individual must decide in each 
period whether to accept a job offer rather than remaining unemployed for 
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another period, in which case he or she remains available to accept some 
better job that might be offered in the future.
To date, there are only a few published papers that simulate and 
analyze the impact of immigration within this search and matching frame-
work. Ortega (2000) analyzed immigration between two countries in 
a stylized model with only one type of labor. Liu (2010) analyzed the 
impact of un authorized low-skilled immigration between 1970 and 2005 
on un employment in the United States. Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) 
generalized these two papers and analyzed the impact of immigration 
between 2000 and 2009 on the U.S. labor market. Finally, Chassamboulli 
and Peri (2015) analyzed the impact of curtailing illegal immigration from 
Mexico. What these studies share is the seemingly paradoxical result that 
although larger immigration flows may generate higher rates of unemploy-
ment in some sectors, overall, the rate of unemployment for native workers 
declines.
In the baseline version of the Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) model, 
immigration increased the size of the overall labor force by 6.1 percent over 
the course of a decade. A slightly larger share of the immigrants had college 
degrees compared to natives, 28.8 percent versus 27.4 percent. The influx 
caused a decline of 0.31 percent in the wages of high-skilled native workers 
and a rise of 0.24 percent in the wages of low-skilled native workers. These 
results mimic the patterns of change in wages implied by the analysis in 
Figures 4-8 and 4-9. At the same time, the long-run rate of unemployment 
simulated by the model dropped as a result of immigration from 6.10 per-
cent to 5.46 percent for low-skilled natives and from 2.40 percent to 2.02 
percent for high-skilled natives. Why do both unemployment rates decline?
The explanation is that in all of these search and matching models, 
searching for new workers is costly for firms. The entry of new work-
ers through migration increases the likelihood of filling a vacant position 
quickly and thus reduces the net cost of posting new offers. The fact that 
immigrants in each skill category earn less than natives reinforces this 
effect. Though immigrants compete with natives for these additional jobs, 
the overall number of new positions employers choose to create is larger 
than the number of additional entrants to the labor market. The effect is to 
lower the unemployment rate and to strengthen the bargaining position of 
workers. Hence, aggregating across the two skill types, wages for all natives 
increase by 0.07 percent.
According to the simulations performed by Chassamboulli and Palivos 
(2014), the new immigrants who arrived between 2000 and 2009 had a 
particularly large and positive impact on the wages paid to the pre-existing 
stock of immigrants, whether high or low skilled. This result contradicts 
much of the empirical literature on wage effects, which generally finds that 
new immigrants are close substitutes for previous waves of immigrants. 
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In the simulations performed by Chassamboulli and Peri (2015), a 
drop of 50 percent in the stock of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico, 
accomplished by either stricter border enforcement or more deportations, 
will raise the wages of low-skilled workers by 0.56 percent and lower wages 
for high-skilled workers by 0.35 percent. At the same time, the removal of 
these unauthorized immigrants lowers the rate of employment for high-
skilled workers from a baseline rate of 87.00 percent to 86.94 percent. 
The now smaller number of unauthorized immigrants, all assumed to be 
low skilled, impedes firms’ overall incentive to search for these types of 
workers, causing the employment rate for low-skilled workers to drop from 
73.0 percent to 72.4 percent. 
What one learns from the papers investigating the effect of immigration 
on unemployment using search and matching models is that whatever the 
short-term impact of immigration on unemployment found in empirical 
studies, it would be wrong to automatically assume that an increase in the 
flow of new immigrants must necessarily push up the rate of unemployment 
in the long run. In short, immigration can lower native unemployment by 
reducing search costs for employers.
4.8 CONCLUSIONS
The theoretical models point to many ways in which economic 
responses by individuals and firms are expected to mitigate the initial 
impact of immigration on the labor markets of receiving countries. Once 
immigration changes the relative prices of labor and capital, factor inputs 
are reallocated across sectors and firms may adjust their technology and 
output mix to make more intensive use of workers. The existing labor force 
may also respond by investing in certain skills and upgrading their human 
capital (as discussed further in Chapter 6). However, theoretical models 
are at best partial representations of the real-world objects they seek to 
analyze. For models to be tractable, assumptions are made to ignore cer-
tain phenomena or to fix the values of some key economic variables. For 
example, aggregating across different types of workers and across different 
types of immigrants and natives necessarily means a loss of detail. Still, 
a few important insights into the impact of immigration on the receiving 
economy emerge.
First, the arrival of an unanticipated inflow of immigrants initially 
affects the economy by changing the wage structure—reducing the wages 
of those natives most similar to immigrants but possibly raising the 
wages of other natives—and by increasing the return to capital. Second, 
the responses of capital and technology mean many, though not all, of 
these initial changes may be transitory in nature. In the long run, changes 
in the economy’s output mix and the adoption of technology that favors 
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immigrant labor provide potentially important adjustment mechanisms to 
mitigate adverse wage effects of immigration. Decisions of natives to move 
into occupations where they have a comparative advantage or to invest in 
their human capital may also reduce adverse wage effects.
Third, the arrival of immigrants raises the overall income of the native 
population that absorbs them: the immigration surplus. This surplus is 
directly related to the degree to which immigration changes wages and 
returns to capital. In the simplest models, the more wages decline, the 
larger the surplus. Moreover, the size of the surplus is likely to be small—
far smaller than the effect immigration has on the distribution of income. 
Immigration enlarges the economy while leaving the native population 
slightly better off on average, but the greatest beneficiaries of immigration 
are the immigrants themselves as they avail themselves of opportunities not 
available to them in their home countries.
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